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The Kingdom of Hawaii suffered a disastrous series of epidemics 
starting from the first contact with Captain Cook's crew and continu-
ing to the present. Despite the huge volume of shipping to and 
through Hawaii, one plague failed to appear. Yellow Jack (yellow 
fever) engendered more fear in sailors of the 19th century than any 
other disease. By 1910 the details of transmission were well-known 
and Hawaii met all the requirements for an epidemic. On October 
30, 1910, the first case of shipboard yellow fever arrived at Honolulu 
but quarantine averted the threat. On October 28, 1911, a Hawaiian 
man, employed as a quarantine guard, was reported to have yellow 
fever and efforts were initiated to control a possible epidemic. This 
was the only occurrence of yellow fever in Hawaii. 
In 1911 Honolulu was a different place. The last decade of the 
1800s had seen the overthrow of the monarchy, establishment of the 
Republic of Hawaii, and annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by the 
United States of America. Most everyone including the native 
Hawaiian population expected the Hawaiian race to disappear. At 
the same time the great powers of Europe and the U.S. were in an 
imperialistic mode spreading Western civilization, good and bad, 
around the globe. The changes in Hawaii were not sudden, of 
course, but had proceeded steadily for a century and a quarter. 
Despite the very large influence of the Europeans and Americans in 
the local political and business affairs of Hawaii, it was the push for 
control in the Pacific basin that made Hawaii a strategic prize 
important enough that the U.S. was willing to annex the territory of 
Hawaii. The U.S. had coveted and obtained the use of Pearl Harbor 
as a naval base a number of years before, but the Spanish-American 
war with its reach into the Philippines was the catalyst that finally 
brought the Hawaiian Islands into the American fold over consid-
erable objection at home. 
The Hawaii that Robert Louis Stevenson visited in 1893 (and 
complained about as being too modern) underwent a flood of 
changes before Jack London made his visit in 1915. Electricity, 
street cars, telephones, the transpacific cable, automobiles, the first 
airplane, production of movies, and dramatic economic activity 
following annexation highlighted the technological transformation 
of the islands. Thrum's Annual lists 1910 as a year of exceptional 
prosperity with a cash balance instead of the usual debt. Perhaps the 
appearance of Halley's Comet in that year had an influence, but 
1911 was noted by Thrum's Annual as another year of marked 
prosperity notwithstanding conditions threatening the public health. 
From a public health standpoint, Honolulu for years had been a 
disaster of major proportions. Eminent medical historian O.A. 
Bushnell has said it well: 
Honolulu in 1820 was an ugly, barren, hot, and feculent town, a 
straggle of grass huts and a very few stone or adobe houses. Its 
residents sweltered amid clouds of dust or skidded along in mud often 
ankle-deep ... Foreigners might sweat and complain ... [but were] too 
impatient for an early escape from this dismal port to care about 
-
beauty, or comfort, or civic pride. Natives, knowing nothing about 
towns in other parts of the world, thought that this was how all 
seaports must be ... From the beginning Honolulu's residents seemed 
determined to earn for their town the name by which eventually it was 
known to sailors throughout the seven seas: The Cesspit of the Pacific. 
The kingdom of Hawaii suffered a disastrous series of epidemics 
beginning with the first contact with Captain Cook's crew and 
continuing to the present. The reduction of the Native Hawaiian 
population was so severe and arguably so psychologically devastat-
ing that all hope was lost for the future of the race. Concomitantly, 
the vacuum was filled by all sorts of mariners, professional and 
indentured labor, as well as by religious and entrepreneurial oppor-
tunists. These travelers brought diseases to which the natives had 
had no exposure and thus kanaka maoli suffered dramatically 
severe consequences. The epidemics that rolled over the Sandwich 
Islands had indeed produced great concern for public health, pro-
ducing such draconian measures as forced isolation of lepers on 
Molokai and the setting of sanitary fires to control bubonic plague. 
Those fires, burning out of control, destroyed 35 acres of Chinatown 
at an estimated cost of over $3 million. Quarantine and strict control 
of port access were the usual but mostly futile attempts to solve 
health problems. 
Honolulu pilots were authorized to inquire about the health of 
passengers and crews, especially as to smallpox, as early as 1836. 
Laws passed in 1839 provided for vital statistics and quarantine 
regulations. The next year, reporting of certain diseases was re-
quired within 24 hours. The first Hawaii Board of Health ( 1850) was 
appointed just two years after the beginning of the public health 
movement in London. The first sanitary commission was appointed 
in 1862 followed by legislation for isolation of lepers in 1865. 
Although animosity raged between ship's crews and the mission-
ary-influenced government over the availability of female compan-
ionship, it was not untill892 that the Board of Health was placed 
in charge of prostitution. 
The Holocaust of 1900, the Chinatown fire, brought concern for 
public safety to a new level. Victoria Hospital was established in 
Kakaako for the destitute whose houses had burned in the fire. In 
1901 the Tuberculosis Home opened (the next year it was renamed 
Honolulu Home for Incurables and later, Leahi Hospital). After 
annexation (1898) the U.S. Public Health and Marine Hospital 
Service was in charge of inspection, diagnosis and quarantine of 
vessels arriving in Hawaiian waters. The Territorial Board of Health 
was responsible for measures ashore, answering to the legislature 
and the Territorial governor who in turn answered to the U.S. 
Department of the Interior. Correspondence and reports of the chief 
sanitary inspector during the year 1911 reveal detailed and lengthy 
studies of the rat control program initiated some 10 years earlier 
because of an epidemic of plague that affected most of the islands. 
In fact Kalihi Camp had been established for detention purposes 
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during the plague epidemic of 1899 to 1900. 
But the biggest contribution to a healthy Honolulu was a safe 
water supply, a sewage system and garbage disposal, all of which 
were completed in the first decade of the 1900s. The census of pure 
Hawaiians, however, dropped from 29,799 in 1900 to 26,011 in 
1910 but also showed the beginning of an upsurge in part-Hawai-
ians. The Board of Health and physicians of Honolulu made little 
progress in educating the populace in proper health practices until 
some of Honolulu's citizens joined in to convince the governor to 
appoint a Sanitary Commission, marking the acceptance by the 
Territorial government of responsibility for the public health. The 
sanitary campaign of 1911 included: enforcement of a law against 
bovine tuberculosis, introduction by the Dairymen's Association of 
the electrical treatment of milk (Goucher system, first of its kind 
west of the Mississippi), tracing an outbreak of cholera to a taro 
patch in Manoa, and evaluation of a few cases of smallpox in Puerto 
Ricans. A mass meeting of citizens declared themselves for a clean 
city and supported a bill for a Board of Health emergency fund. 
Governor Frear appointed the Sanitary Commission with George R. 
Carter, former governor, as its head to investigate and advise on the 
health conditions of the city. Sunday, July 24 was a clean-up day. 
All public offices and places ofbusiness closed to permit everyone's 
sharing in the workforthe common good. The Sanitary Commission's 
extensive report of 1912 marked the beginning of modern public 
health in Hawaii. 
Despite the huge volume of shipping to and through Hawaii and 
the devastation by diseases from the outside world, one plague had 
failed to appear. Yellow Jack! Perhaps no pestilence engendered 
more fear in the sailors of the 19th century than the dreaded yellow 
fever, present in certain notorious tropical ports of the New World. 
Other diseases produced more deaths and more sudden epidemics 
on shipboard but some aspects of Yellow Jack were particularly 
awesome. First it was unpredictable-no one knew just when or if 
it would attack. Direct contact with infected persons did not seem to 
be a prerequisite. Once it appeared on shipboard it struck sporadi-
cally and indiscriminately, occurring in individuals at random over 
periods of months at sea. The disease was highly lethal, with no 
procedures known that could control it. 
Ports in the Caribbean, South America, and Central America were 
especially dangerous but, strangely, not so sometimes. Further-
more, American cities were not immune. In 1793 the city of 
Philadelphia, the most modern city in the U.S., was virtually wiped 
out. The epidemic of 1878 killed 5,000 people in Memphis, Tennes-
see and 30,000 were driven out of the stricken city. That same year's 
epidemic was estimated to have cost the country $100 million and 
New Orleans alone claimed a loss of $10 million. Despite the lack 
of evidence of effectiveness, the common practice was to burn any 
ship's cargo where yellow fever was on board; burn bedding, 
clothing and anything contaminated with the black vomit or blood 
of the victims. 
In contrast to the local perception that only Hawaiians were struck 
down by epidemic diseases, it was known that Yellow Jack cared 
not a whit if its prey were white, black, brown, or yellow. The 
victim's only comfort was knowing that if he or she did survive he 
or she was immune for life. Thus the population of Hawaii, and 
anyone coming from the temperate zones of Europe, America, and 
Asia (which supplied the overwhelming mass of immigrants to 
Hawaii) were mostly susceptible to yellow fever. 
As with all scientific progress, unraveling the mysteries of yellow 
fever was the work of many, building on the achievements of others. 
Although we think of Walter Reed of the U.S. Army as the one who 
conquered yellow fever, making possible the U.S. success in con-
structing the Panama Canal whereas the French had failed, it was Dr 
Carlos Finley, a Cuban physician in Havana, who handed to the 
American commission, headed by Dr Reed, a porcelain cup contain-
ing the eggs of Culex mosquitoes. Twenty years of work, unsubstan-
tiated and mostly ignored, he bestowed on Reed on August 1, 1900. 
Finley, of course, was indebted to others who were pioneers in the 
fields of malarial and filarial parasites. The medical politics of the 
day was no less vicious than that surrounding the pursuit of the 
double helix and the discovery of the AIDS virus of more recent 
times. In spite of the congenial start, antagonism soon erupted over 
who should have the glory of discovery. To be fair, and perhaps 
romantic, we might call Finley the genius whose insight (guess?) 
came up with the correct answer, and he then passed on to Reed and 
Carrol the responsibility of supplying the proof and practical appli-
cation of the new knowledge in control of yellow fever. 
By 1910 the details of transmission of yellow fever, incubation in 
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, and the potential for its establishment in 
a given locale were well-known. The modern view suggests that the 
organism was a native ofWestAfricaand made its way to the New 
World after the advent of the slave trade. Nevertheless there was a 
delay in the appearance of yellow fever until the proper mosquito 
had been established in the Caribbean, Brazil, and Central America. 
The mosquito does not survive as a permanent resident unless the 
temperature remains above 72°F.It is domesticated in that it breeds 
only in artificial or protected containers such as water casks, 
cisterns, or perhaps pools trapped in leaves of plants. Hawaii met all 
the requirements including the presence of the Aedes aegypti 
mosquito, and it was prime territory for this Yellow Jack. Commer-
cial trade routes brought many ships, U.S. and foreign, to Hawaii 
after having called in South America, the west coast of Central 
America and Mexico. The Panama Canal, opened August 15, 1915, 
exposed Hawaii to direct commerce from the Caribbean. 
Dr J.S.B. Pratt, member of the Territorial Board of Health, 
undertook a six month working vacation in 1910 to study yellow 
fever and mosquito elimination methods in South America, Panama, 
and Mexico. That same year, considerable effort and attention was 
documented by official telegrams requesting clarification of the 
dangers and procedures to be followed with regard to yellow fever 
when ships arrived from the west coast of Central and South 
America. The replies from Washington were reassuring, noting that 
the ports of Santa Clara and Manzanilla had instituted strict fumiga-
tion measures and no cases had been detected in the last year. In fact, 
officials in Honolulu were quite worried that quarantine procedures 
were about to be relaxed. Indeed, on October 30, 1910 the first case 
of shipboard yellow fever arrived at Honolulu but quarantine 
averted the threat to the city (Report of the Governor of Hawaii to 
the Secretary of the Interior, 1911). 
On October21, 1911 the Hong Kong MaruboundforYokohama 
carrying cargo from South America by way ofManzanilla, Mexico, 
put in for coal and supplies at Honolulu with a sickness on board. 
The sick passenger in steerage had boarded the vessel at Callao, 
Peru. The Japanese surgeon on board knew about the sick man but 
did not report it. The federal quarantine officer came upon the sick 
man during his inspection and called for help from more experi-
enced doctors at the Quarantine Station. A diagnosis of yellow fever 
on shipboard was made, and oddly, it was aboard the same vessel 
that had brought the first case the year before. Quarantine guards 
were placed on board while the ship was thoroughly fumigated. 
Barges of coal were towed out to the ship and on return were also 
fumigated. The headline of the newspaper article that day asked: 
"NOW WILL CITIZENS MOVE? Beware of the Third Time Says 
Dr Ramus-City Must Be Mosquito Proofed" (The Pacific Com-
mercial Advertiser, October 21, 1911). 
The next event was more startling. Newspaper articles and the 
-
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Chief Sanitary Inspector's Report tell the story: A Hawaiian man 
was reported October 28, 1911 to have yellow fever. The diagnosis 
was made by Drs Ramus, Marshall, Currie, Hobdy, Pratt and Major 
Kennesly, the only doctors in the islands known to have had 
experience with yellow fever. The infected man was one of the 
quarantine guards placed on board during the fumigation of the 
Hong Kong Maru. He had become ill and left the ship without 
notification to return to his home at Kalihi Camp which by that time 
was no longer in use as a detention station. What remained of the 
camp were 40 shacks in three irregular rows in an area of 9 acres. 
This area and the inhabitants were placed in quarantine October 28. 
The patient was thought to have been sick for three days, the period 
of illness when the biting mosquito can acquire the virus. The 
incubation period in mosquitoes is approximately 7 to 12 days 
before it becomes infective for others. Therefore, it was calculated 
that at least a three or four day window of safety existed. In a circle 
100 yards outside the infected camp, all the trees and shrubs were cut 
(starting outside and working inward) in order to remove any shade 
for the Stegomia calopus (Aedes aegypti), a day mosquito which has 
a short flight distance of 100 to 200 yards. Next, everyone's clothing 
was inspected in the sunlight and shaken to expel mosquitoes. 
Clothing, boxes, and containers were brushed and dusted. After this 
each person with his or her effects was passed through to a quaran-
tine station to stay until he or she could find new living quarters. He 
or she could remain at the station if indigent. The station was 
established and the quarantine area was staffed by the U.S. Army as 
requested by the civilian committee, which was established to deal 
with the public during this crisis. It was believed that the military 
was the only organization capable of adequately performing this 
task. After depopulation all the trees were cut except for a few fruit 
trees which were completely trimmed of foliage, shrubbery, and 
weeds , working from outside to the center. Lean-tos and shacks 
were torn down, carted to the beach and burned. Fumigation of all 
houses was done with sulfur dioxide. Three hundred fifty people 
were treated, 38 houses were fumigated (three times at least 8 hours 
apart) and, for an area of one mile outside, a vigorous mosquito 
extermination program was instituted (Report of the President of the 
Board of Health of the Territory of Hawaii for the 12 months ended 
June 30, 1912). 
The patient recovered quickly and no other cases developed. The 
city did not recover quite so easily. A very moving editorial had 
appeared in The Pacific Commercial Advertiser the day the Hong 
Kong Maru arrived and the passenger with yellow fever was found. 
The editor praised the personnel of the United States Marine 
Hospital Service for protesting and resisting the relaxation of 
quarantine procedures for ships leaving Latin American ports. In the 
words of the editorial, "The enemy is at our door, more merciless 
than an army before a besieged city .. .It is a well-known fact that it 
sometimes takes a lot to arouse public opinion and the best and only 
way is to set before the people, who will have to take action some 
time-either cleaning up the mosquito or burying their dead-the 
seriousness of the situation ... " It was pointed out in the accompany-
ing articles that it was just plain good luck that the ship did not enter 
the harbor with the disease undetected, but it was bad luck that a 
southerly breeze was blowing onshore from the ship's anchorage. 
A week later when the diagnosis of yellow fever was made in the 
local man, a mass meeting of the citizens led to appointment of a 
commission for eradication of the mosquitoes that transmit the 
disease. Military cooperation was promised. A special session of the 
legislature was called and the whole community plunged into the 
task. Well, almost everyone. Another article in the paper dated 
November 1, says that every white man of prominence in the city 
was present at the citizens' meeting but not one citizen of Hawaiian 
-
or part-Hawaiian blood was to be found. Dr Currie of the U.S. 
Marine Hospital Service, who played a leading role in the New 
Orleans fight for self-preservation, was put in charge and something 
akin to martial law was established by the Board of Health. A list of 
22 statements outlined what every citizen of Honolulu was to do to 
eliminate mosquitoes and their breeding places. It was thought that 
the only valuable plants that had to be destroyed were banana trees. 
Some people questioned the actions but, should the citizen not 
comply, then the authorities with the help of the National Guard 
would do the job for them. Deputy Sheriff Rose apparently resisted. 
He was given the choice of cutting his banana trees himself, using 
his firearm against the soldiers, or stepping aside and having the 
trees cut for him. In the latter cases he would end up in jail with the 
trees cut in any case and enduring the embarrassment of having 
broken the law he was sworn to uphold. The same treatment was to 
be meted out to Harry T. Mills of Kaimuki or any others who might 
follow their example. (Various articles in The Pacific Commercial 
Advertiser, October 21 to November 5, 1911.) 
The annual report of the Board of Health for the year ending June 
30, 1912, listed a grand total of 508,877 inspections of gutters, 
cesspools, privies, tin cans, pools, holes in trees, rice plantations, 
etc. Larvae were found in 20,529 of these. Legal notices served, 625; 
nuisances abated, 532; ditches dug, 50 miles. The report detailed the 
difficulties encountered when occasionally a citizen refused. The 
Attorney General's department was so crowded that prompt legal 
attention to these matters was not possible. The details of making a 
case were so subject to error that only a few came before the court, 
but in those cases a favorable decision was easily won. When 
citizens were served with a legal notice, they almost invariably 
corrected the matter complained of, but it appeared to be quite 
impossible to secure a uniform, automatic compliance with the law. 
When the services of the military were no longer available, it 
became necessary to establish a permanent force of civilian inspec-
tors. This was accomplished by February 1912. Eventually a force 
of 20 inspectors and 20 laborers was found to be sufficient for the 
entire city. The results were thoughtto be quite satisfactory. The day 
mosquito was reduced to negligible numbers and had disappeared 
completely in most parts of the city. 
Some individuals sued for compensation for the loss of their 
property, mainly banana trees cut down. 
From a distance in time of 90 years, it may be difficult to 
appreciate fully the fears of the Hawaiian community with regard to 
yellow fever. There were many huikau native Hawaiians and little 
guy provincials who perceived the threat as something big business, 
big government, and the haole were concerned with. But the 
governments of the Pacific Rim and the subcontinent of India at the 
turn of the century were not in this state of mind. They were 
intimately acquainted with the scourge of malaria, filariasis, chol-
era, plague and were nearly hysterical that yellow fever, never seen 
in their regions, would have a direct and free passage by way of the 
Panama Canal to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Rockefeller 
Foundation, organized in 1913 for "the well-being of mankind 
throughout the world," created the International Health Commis-
sion of the Foundation with Wickliffe Rose as its director. That 
winter Mr Rose went abroad to discuss with health officials a 
possible program for the newly created commission. He found great 
concern throughout the East regarding yellow fever. Dr S.P. James 
of the Indian Medical Service called for a permanent quarantine 
force in Panama, Hong Kong, or Singapore to be maintained at the 
expense of the English colonies in the East. He recommended a 
systematic attack on the mosquitoes. Sanitarians recognized that 
once yellow fever was introduced into the Orient, with its dense 
population of nonimmunes, incalculable damage would accrue. The 
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Foundation sought and obtained the service of Major General 
William Crawford Gorgas, Surgeon General of the United States 
Army. He had effected the eradication of yellow fever from Havana 
and the Panama Canal Zone, and now was more than eager to extend 
his efforts as director of the Yell ow Fever Commission of the 
Foundation. 
To date no other occurrence of yellow fever in the Pacific beyond 
the coasts of Latin America has been found. By definition there was 
an epidemic of yellow fever in Hawaii in 1911. By skill, luck, and 
public concern, that epidemic consisted of only one case. Hawaii 
has much to be proud of in the management of the epidemic that 
never was. 
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The Auxiliary of HMA created a rich 
biographical resource of past physicians 
called In Memoriam -Doctors of Ha-
waii which tried to have information on 
every physician who practiced in Ha-
waii. The project ended more than 10 
years ago, but this historical resource is 
still heavily used. To make this unique 
resource more accessible, we are putting 
the data base on the Internet on our Home 
Page. 
The Hawaii Medical Library might be 
more known for the latest journals and 
resources for clinical medicine, but we 
are also working to preserve our medical 
history. We welcome donations to the 
collection including photographs relat-
ing to medicine, historical medical in-
struments, rare books, personal papers or 
memoirs on history of medicine in Ha-
waii, or you might like to volunteer to 
help work on these collections. Call the 
Library Archives section if you have any 
questions about the history of medicine. 
